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Abstract—Attack-tolerant distributed systems change their pro-
tocols on-the-fly in response to apparent attacks from the envi-
ronment; they substitute functionally equivalent versions possibly
more resistant to detected threats. Alternative protocols can
be packaged together as a single adaptive protocol or variants
from a formal protocol library can be sent to threatened groups
of processes. We are experimenting with libraries of attack-
tolerant protocols that are correct-by-construction and testing
them in environments that simulate specified threats, including
constructive versions of the famous FLP imaginary adversary
against fault-tolerant consensus. We expect that all variants of
tolerant protocols are automatically generated and accompanied
by machine checked proofs that the generated code satisfies formal
properties.
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Background
Using a constructive Logic of Events based on Compu-
tational Type Theory (CTT) [ABC06], [CB08], [Bic09] we
have been able to formally specify safety and liveness prop-
erties for distributed protocols and synthesize executable code
from constructive proofs that the specifications are realizable
[CB08]. We have used this proofs-as-processes method to
build fault-tolerant protocols, provably secure protocols, and
adaptive protocols [LKvR+99]. Recently we have created
versions of the important Paxos consensus protocol [Lam01]
this way. This basic methodology has led us to experiment
with protocols that we think of as attack-tolerant in the
sense that they can respond to perceived threats from the
environment such as denial of service attacks, message order
attacks, Byzantine attacks, and other threats. These attack-
tolerant protocols will respond by adapting on-the-fly to al-
ternative versions that are also known to be provably correct
and provide the same functionality. This system development
capability is based on a computational semantics for assertions
in our standard Logic of Events. This logic is based on
the concept of event structures [Win89], [Abr99] which are
defined over executions of process in the standard model of
asynchronous message passing computation [Lyn96], [AW04].
This semantics is expressed in CTT in such a way that
proof terms contain distributed realizers. These realizers are
abstract processes which can be compiled into appropriate
programming languages such as Java, ML, Erlang, F#, etc.
A key step in making this methodology practical is the use
of programmable event classes to specify computing tasks at
a high level of abstraction that can be refined automatically
to processes. Recently we have extended our methodology
to a broader notion of process, a General Process Model
[BC10a], broad enough to encompass the higher-order pi-
calculus [Mil09] and other process algebras that include Petri
nets. In the new model we can synthesize and reason about
mobile processes as well.
B. Outline
In the next section we describe our formal computing model
and the basic concepts needed to talk about mobile processes
and to state assumptions on the computing environment. A
simple consensus protocol illustrates the key ideas. In the final
section we discuss the construction of attack-tolerant protocols
based on synthetic code diversity and show how to state prop-
erties of the environment and create experimental computing
platforms to test attack-tolerant protocols, for instance by
launching a provably unbeatable attack with a constructive
version of the Fischer/Lynch/Paterson result [FLP85].
II. FORMAL DISTRIBUTED COMPUTING MODEL
Here is a brief overview of our new General Process Model
[BC10a] of distributed computation. We mention key concepts
for reasoning about event structures created from these com-
putations. A system consists of a set of components. Each
component has a location, an internal part, and an external
part. Locations are just abstract identifiers. There may be
more than one component with the same location. The internal
part of a component is a process—its program and internal
(possibly hidden) state. The external part of a component is
its interface with the rest of the system. In this account, the
interface will be a list of messages, containing either data
or processes, labeled with the location of the recipient. The
“higher order” ability to send a message containing a process
allows a system to grow by “forking” or “bootstrapping” new
components. A system executes as follows. At each step, the
environment may choose and remove a message from the
external component. If the chosen message is addressed to
a location that is not yet in the system, then a new component
is created at that location, using a given boot-process, and an
empty external part. Each component at the recipient location
receives the message as input and computes a pair that contains
a process and an external part. The process becomes the
next internal part of the component, and the external part is
appended to the current external part of the component. A
potentially infinite sequence of steps, starting from a given
system and using a given boot-process, is a run of that system.
From a run of a system we derive an abstraction of its behavior
by focusing on the events in the run. The events are the pairs,
〈x, n〉, of a location and a step at which location x gets
an input message at step n, i.e. information is transferred.
Every event has a location, and there is a natural causal-
ordering on the set of events, the ordering first considered by
Lamport [Lam78]. This allows us to define an event-ordering,
a structure, 〈E, loc, <, info〉, in which the causal ordering
< is transitive relation on E that is well-founded, and locally-
finite (each event has only finitely many predecessors). Also,
the events at a given location are totally ordered by <. The
information, info(e), associated with event e is the message
input to loc(e) when the event occurred. We have found
that requirements for distributed systems can be expressed
as (higher-order) logical propositions about event-orderings.
To illustrate this and motivate the results in the rest of the
paper we present a simple example of consensus in a group
of processes.
Example 1. A simple consensus protocol: TwoThirds
Each participating component will be a member of some
groups and each group has a name, G. A message 〈G, i〉 from
the environment to component i informs it that it is in group G.
The groups have n = 3f+1 members, and they are designed to
tolerate f failures. When any component in a group G receives
a message 〈[start ], G〉 it starts the consensus protocol whose
goal is to decide on values received by the members from
clients. We assume that once the protocol starts, each process
has received a value vi or has a default non-value. The simple
TwoThirds consensus protocol is this: A process Pi that has a
value vi of type T starts an election to choose a value of type
T (with a decidable equality) from among those received by
members of the group from clients. The elections are identified
by natural numbers, eli initially 0, and incremented by 1, and a
Boolean variable decidei is initially false. The function from
lists of values, Msg i to a value is a parameter of the protocol.
If the type T of values is Boolean, we can take f to be the
majority function.
Begin
Until decidei do:
1. Increment eli; 2. Broadcast vote 〈eli, vi〉 to G;
3. Collect in list Msg i 2f + 1 votes of election eli;
4. Choose vi := f(Msg i);
5. If Msg i is unanimous then decidei := true
End
We describe protocols like this by classifying the events occur-
ring during execution. In this algorithm there are Input, Vote,
Collect, and Decide events. The components can recognize
events in each of these event classes (in this example they
could all have distinctive headers), and they can associate
information with each event (e.g. 〈ei, vi〉 with Vote, Msg i
with Collect, and f(Msg i) with Decide). Events in some
classes cause events with related information content in other
classes, e.g. Collect causes a Vote event with value f(Msg i).
In general, an event class X is a function on events in an event
ordering that effectively partitions events into two sets, E(X)
and E−E(X), and assigns a value X(e) to events e ∈ E(X).
Example 2. Consensus specification: TwoThirds
Let P and D be the classes of events with headers propose
and decide, respectively. Then the safety specification of a
consensus protocol is the conjunction of two propositions
on (extended) event-orderings, called agreement (all decision
events have the same value) and responsiveness (the value
decided on must be one of the values proposed):
∀e1, e2 :E(D). D(e1) = D(e2)
∀e :E(D). ∃e′ :E(P ). e′ < e ∧ D(e) = P (e′)
We can prove safety and the following liveness property about
TwoThirds. We say that activity in the protocol contracts to
a subset S of exactly 2f + 1 processes if these processes all
vote in election n say at vt(n)1, ..., vt(n)k for k = 2f + 1
and collect these votes at c(n)1, ..., c(n)k, and all vote again
in election n+ 1 at vt(n+ 1)1, ..., vt(n+ 1)k, and collect at
c(n+ 1)1, ..., c(n+ 1)k. In this case, these processes in S all
decide in round n + 1 for the value given by f applied to
the collected votes. This is a liveness property. If exactly f
processes fail, then the activity of the group G contracts to
some S and decides. Likewise if the message traffic is such
that f processes are delayed for an election, then the protocol
contracts to S and decides. This fact shows that the TwoThirds
protocol is non-blocking, i.e. from any state of the protocol,
there is a path to a decision. We can construct the path to
a decision given a set of f processes that we delay. We also
proved safety and liveness of a variant of this protocol that can
converge to consensus faster. In this variant, if Pi receives a
vote 〈e, v〉 from a higher election, e > eli, then Pi joins that
election by setting eli := e; vi := v; and then going to step 2.
A. Realizers and Strong Realizers
If ψ is a proposition about event orderings, e.g. liveness,
we say that a system realizes ψ, if the event-ordering of
any run of the system satisfies ψ. We extend the “proofs-as-
programs” paradigm to “proofs-as-processes“ for distributed
computing by making constructive proofs that requirements
are realizable. For compositional reasoning, it is desirable
to create a strong realizer of requirement ψ—a system that
realizes ψ in any context. Formally, system S is a strong
realizer of ψ if the event-ordering of any run of a system
S′ such that S ⊆ S′, satisfies ψ. If S1 is a strong realizer of
ψ1 and S2 is a strong realizer of ψ2, then S1 ∪ S2 is a strong
realizer of ψ1∧ ψ2. One of our main tools is that propagation
rules like those used in the consensus example have strong
realizers. A realizer for a propagation rule A f⇒ B@g is a set
of components that can each, as a (computable) function of
the history of inputs at its location, recognize, and compute
the value v of events in class A that occur there and send
messages that will eventually result in an events in class B
with value f(v) at each location in g(v). We call the classes A
that can be so recognized programmable. Basic event classes
are programmable, and the set of programmable event classes
is closed under a variety of combinators. Thus many classes
can be automatically shown to be programmable, and their
recognizers generated automatically, see [Bic09]. If B is a
basic class and if we have reliable message delivery, then a
component may cause an event in B by placing a message with
an appropriate header on its external part. A rule, A ⇒ B
is programmable-basic (PB) if A is programmable and B
is basic. Under the assumption of reliable message delivery,
every PB-rule is realizable.
Reliable message delivery is an assumption about the envi-
ronment. In this case, the assumption is a fairness assumption
on the choices the environment makes, stating that all mes-
sages in the external part of a component will eventually be
chosen. We weaken this assumption by allowing some com-
ponents to suffer send omission faults. Under that assumption,
parameterized by a set of locations, F , called the fail-set, every
message on the external part of a component whose location
is not in F , will eventually be delivered. If send omissions
are allowed, not every PB-rule is realizable, but the restricted
rule A|(¬F ) ⇒ B is realizable, when A ⇒ B is PB, and
A|(¬F ) is the class of A-events whose location is not in
the fail-set. A fault-tolerant protocol like TwoThirds can be
described by such restricted rules, and proved correct under
appropriate assumptions on the size of the fail-set. A PB-rule
A⇒ B is also strongly realizable. Some desirable properties
of protocols like consensus do not follow from conjunctions of
PB-rules alone. We also need some propagation constraints,
of the form A f⇐ B@g. A realizer constructed for A f⇒ B@g
will generate B-events only from A-events, so it will also
realize A f⇐ B@g.
III. ATTACK TOLERANCE
We assume that our systems will be attacked. We will
protect protocols by formally generating a large number of
logically equivalent variants, stored in an attack response
library. Each variant uses distinctly different code which a
system under attack can install on-the-fly to replace compro-
mised components. Each variant is known to be equivalent and
correct. We express threatening features of the environment
formally and discriminate among the different types. We can
do this in our new GPM model because the environment
is an explicit component about which we can reason. This
capability allows us to study in depth how diversity works
to defend systems. We can implement attack scenarios as
part of our experimental platform. It is interesting that we
can implement a constructive version [RC08] of the famous
Fischer/Lynch/Paterson result [FLP85] that shows how an
attacker can keep any deterministic fault-tolerant consensus
protocol from achieving consensus.
A. Synthetic Code Diversity
We introduce diversity at all levels of the formal code
development (synthesis) process starting at a very high level
of abstraction. For example, in the TwoThirds protocol, we
can use different functions f , alter the means of collecting
Msg i, synthesize variants of the protocol, alter the data types,
etc. We are able to create multiple provably correct versions
of protocols at each level of development, e.g. compiling
TwoThirds into Java, Erlang, and F#. The higher the starting
point for introducing diversity, the more options we can create.
We can also inject code diversity into the fully automatic
verification of authentication protocols in Protocol Compo-
sition Logic (PCL) [DDMR07] implemented in our system.
These synthetic diversity techniques generate a large set of
components, each of which is associated with a “genotype”
that describes the parameters (such as choice of algorithm,
choice of data structure, choice of implementation language)
used to generate components of its “species”.
B. Formalizing the Environment
We can precisely describe how diversification and recon-
figuration respond to threatening features of the environment
because we can express some threats formally and discriminate
among the different kinds as is done in the Nysiad system
[HvRBD08] to defend against Byzantine attacks. This capa-
bility will allow us to study how diversity defends systems.
For example, we have studied message order attacks in which
the environment delays key messages in consensus protocols
to keep the system from deciding in a timely manner. This is
an instance of the general phenomenon uncovered by Fischer,
Lynch, and Paterson [FLP85] that consensus algorithms can
be systematically defeated, as we discuss next.
a) The Environment as Adversary: The standard version
of the Fischer/Lynch/Paterson theorem is that no deterministic
algorithm can solve the consensus problem for a group of
process in which at least one process might fail. This is a
negative statement, producing only a contradiction, yet implicit
in all proofs is an imagined construction of a nonterminating
execution in which no process decides, they “waffle” endlessly.
It appears that no such explicit construction could be carried
out following the method of the classical proof because there
isn’t enough information given with the protocol.
The key to being able to build the nonterminating execution
is to provide more information, which was done in [RC08]
by introducing the notion of effective nonblocking. Effective
nonblocking is a natural concept when protocols are verified
using constructive logic. P is called effectively nonblocking
if from any reachable global state s of an execution of P
and any subset Q of n − f non-failed processes, we can
find an execution α from s using Q and a process Pα in
Q which decides a value v. Constructively this means that
we have a computable function, wt(s,Q), which produces
an execution α and a state sα in which a process, say Pα
decides a value v. Theorem (CFLP): Given any deterministic
effectively nonblocking consensus procedure P with more
than two processes and tolerating a single failure, we can
effectively construct a nonterminating execution of it. Let the
function produced by this proof be flpc, then for a consensus
procedure such as the TwoThirds protocol given above and
its nonblocking proof nb, we have that the environment can
use flpc(nb) to create a message-order attack that will prevent
TwoThirds from deciding.
IV. CONCLUSION
We are exploring how to build distributed systems that
are attack-tolerant by design. The key idea is to implement
systems that can respond to attacks by modifying their code
in a provably safe way. We believe that the more code variants
we can produce, the more resistant systems are to attack. We
have found ways to automatically produce many provably
equivalent variants of components using formal synthesis.
Variation arises from different choices made during synthesis.
We start at a very high level of abstraction by formally proving
that specifications are achievable. By starting at such a high
level, we discovered more correct options than possible by
less technically advanced methods. This discovery reveals new
reasons for working formally at high levels of abstraction.
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